One of the significant advantages in problems with perfect information, like search or games like checkers, is that they can be decomposed into independent pieces. In contrast, problems with imperfect information, like market modeling or games like poker, are treated as a single decomposable whole. Handling the game as a single unit places a much stricter limit on the size of solvable imperfect information games. This paper has two main contributions. First, we introduce CFR-D, a new variant of the counterfactual regret minimising family of algorithms. For any problem which can be decomposed into a trunk and subproblems, CFR-D can handle the trunk and each subproblem independently. Decomposition lets CFR-D have memory requirements which are sub-linear in the number of decision points, a desirable property more commonly associated with perfect information algorithms. Second, we present an algorithm for recovering an equilibrium strategy in a subproblem given the trunk strategy and some summary information about the subproblem.
Introduction
Perfect information games like checkers, where game states are entirely public, have proven more tractable than games of imperfect information like poker, where some information about the game state is hidden from one or more players. The primary reason is that perfect information games can easily be split into subgames. Any time a player is about to act, the subgames following each possible action can be reasoned about independently from the other actions, from how the state in the game was reached, and from other unreachable states of the game. Reasoning about subgames independently allows for time and memory efficient algorithms like depth-first iterative-deepening [7] .
The corresponding application of decomposition to imperfect information games does not work. Consider the games in Figure 1 . In the left game, the first player gets to choose whether to play tic-tac-toe or checkers. Within this game, the tic-tac-toe and In the right game, there is a chance event, which only the first player ever gets to see. Additionally, some of the outcomes are modified based on the outcome of the first chance event, producing new subproblems like checkers and checkers . The second player does not know which variant they are playing. The correct strategy for player two in checkers /checkers (or, similarly, tic-tac-toe) depends on the likelihood that player one chooses to play checkers and checkers . This choice, however, will depend on the value of the subproblems, which depends on the player two strategy in these subproblems. By adding hidden information which affects the game outcome, the subproblems can no longer be analysed independently in the same way. Any fixed assumptions about the initial player one choice -even if the initial choice is correct for some Nash equilibrium -can suggest a player two strategy that is exploitable by a different initial choice for player one.
Even though decomposing an imperfect information game has previously had no formal guarantees, the memory savings are large enough that decomposition has still been employed in coping with human-scale domains, such as poker. Both PS-Opti [1] and GS1 [4] were strong poker AIs for their time, and both chose to split the game in an unsafe fashion. We present, for the first time, a general method for generating an error-bounded approximation of a Nash equilibrium through decomposing and independently analyzing subproblems of an imperfect information game. We compare this to the prior method, showing that the lack of theoretical bound leads to significant error in practice.
One of the tradeoffs of using decomposition to solve a problem is that only part of the strategy might be kept. If we save space by not storing part of the solution, the missing portions must re-generated as needed. The second contribution of this paper is an error-bounded method of recovering a strategy in a subproblem, using only some information about the root of the subproblem.
Background
An extensive-form game is an explicit description of the possible interaction of one or more agents in some problem domain. There is a set of players P , which for the sake of convenience, we will consider to include a chance agent P c which controls stochastic events. H is a set of all possible game states, represented by the history of actions taken from the initial game state ∅. For any history h ∈ H, P (h) → P ∪ {leaf } gives the player that is about to act or leaf if the game is over, and A(h) gives the set of valid actions. H p is the set of all states h such that P (h) = p. The state h · a is said to be a child of the state h, h is the parent of h · a, and we will say h i is an ancestor of h j or h i h j if h i is the parent of h j or h i h k and h k is the parent of h j . h j if h j or h = j. We will let Z be the set of all leaf states. For every z ∈ Z, u p (z) → gives the payoff for player p if the game ends in state z.
For each player p, hidden information is described by information sets, which are a partition I p of H p . For any information set I ∈ I p , any two states h, j ∈ I are indistinguishable to player p. A behaviour strategy σ p ∈ Σ p is a function σ p (I, a) → which assigns a probability distribution over valid actions to every information set I ∈ I p . We will say σ(h, a) = σ(I(h), a), where I(h) is the information set which contains h. Z(I) = {z s.t. z ∈ Z, z h ∈ I} is the set of all terminal states z reachable from some state in information set I. We could also consider the leaves reachable from I after some action a, stated as Z(I, a) = {z s.t. z ∈ Z, z h · a, h ∈ I}. Conversely, h[S] is the longest history j in some set of states S for which j h. In games with perfect recall, information sets cannot be visited multiple times in a single game, so the longest history in an information set I which reaches h is the only state in I which reaches h. Having a unique ancestor also lets us say an information set J is a child of information set I if for any h ∈ J, h[I] is the longest strict subsequence of h where
A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a tuple of strategies, one for each player. Given a strategy profile σ we can construct a new profile σ σ p which is identical except that player p's strategy has been replaced by σ p . It is also useful to refer to certain products of probabilities. For any h, j ∈ H and σ ∈ Σ, π σ (h) = j,a h σ P (j) (j, a) gives the joint probability of reaching state h if all players follow σ. We also use π p (h) to refer to the product of only the terms where player p acts, and π −p (h) to refer to the product of terms where any player but p acts. We use π(j, h) to refer to the product of terms from j to h, rather than from ∅ to h. Finally, it is useful to speak of replacing portions of a strategy with another strategy: σ [S←σ ] is the strategy that is equal to σ everywhere except at information sets in S, where it is equal to σ .
Given a strategy profile σ, the expected utility u
a strategy for p which maximises p's value if all other player strategies remain fixed. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where all strategies are best responses, and an -Nash equilibrium approximation is a profile where the expected value for each player is within of the value of a best response strategy.
All of the work in this paper assumes two player, zero-sum, perfect recall games. That is, P = {p 1 , p 2 , p c }, for all z ∈ Z u p1 (z) + u p2 (z) = 0, and for any information sets
Existing CFR variants
The Counterfactual Regret minimization (CFR) algorithm [10] is an efficient method for finding an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in very large games. CFR is an iterated self play algorithm, where the average policy across all iterations approaches a Nash equilibrium. It has independent regret minimisation problems being simultaneously updated for every information set, at each iteration. Each minimisation problem at an information set I ∈ I p uses a utility function called counterfactual value:
Informally, the counterfactual value of I for player p is the expected value of I for p of the policy, if p had instead always played to reach I. The regret for a series of profiles, called immediate counterfactual regret, is computed as max a∈A(I) t (v
. The desired end result, minimising regret across the space of entire strategies, is an emergent property. Bounding all of the immediate counterfactual regrets in a tree can be shown to place an upper bound on the regret over all possible strategies in that tree (called full counterfactual regret.) It then immediately follows that minimising immediate counterfactual regrets at all information sets will minimise the regret across all strategies, and another short argument shows that an -regret strategy profile is a 2 -Nash equilibrium. These proofs of convergence to a Nash equilibrium are given by Zinkevich et al.in the original CFR paper [10] .
Using separate regret minimisation problems at each information set makes CFR a very flexible framework for solving games. First, the values for actions are all that is used at any single regret minimisation problem at some information set I. The action probabilities of the strategy profile outside I are otherwise irrelevant. Second, while the strategy profile outside I is generated by the other minimisation problems in CFR, the source does not matter. Any sequence of strategy profiles will do, as long as they have low regret.
As a result, a number of CFR variants have been proposed. Instead of minimising regrets at every information set, they could be sampled, leading to the MCCFR [8] family of algorithms. Instead of doing self play with CFR generating the strategy for both players, CFR-BR [5] uses a best response strategy for one player at each step, which guarantees that the regrets for that player are non-positive. All of these existing variants, including CFR-BR, stores strategy probabilities and counterfactual regrets at every information set for at least one player. Unlike our proposed algorithm, each these existing variants have memory usage that is linear in the number of decisions for the player.
Decomposition into Subproblems
The CFR-BR algorithm provided the inspiration for the method we propose in this paper for handling games through decomposition. In contrast to previous CFR variants, which uses regret minimisation (and storage) to find a strategy for both players, CFR-BR uses a best response for one player. The method splits the game up into a trunk -a portion of the game tree rooted at the start of the game -and a number of independent subproblems. The only necessary condition for the subproblems is that the boundaries of the subproblem do not cross information sets: for any state h in the subproblem, for all j ∈ I(h), j is also in the subproblem.
In the trunk, CFR-BR uses regret minimisation to find the policy for both players.
Within a subproblem, regret minimisation is used only for the player of interest, with the opponent using a best response. At each iteration, after computing a best response and updating regrets for the player of interest, the best response strategy is discarded. As Johanson et al. [5] show, a best response strategy has non-positive cumulative regret after any number of iterations. Having non-positive regret in the subproblems means the regret of the average strategy only depends on the regret within the trunk, and regret in the trunk is guaranteed to be minimised by running CFR. The resulting average strategy is a Nash equilibrium approximation.
With CFR-D, we propose using a best response strategy for both players in subproblems: a Nash equilibrium within the subproblem. Like CFR-BR, we discard this strategy at each iteration. This immediately provides the sub-linear memory properties, as we are finding an approximation of a Nash equilibrium, but are only storing the strategy within the trunk. Correctness immediately follows from the correctness proof in the CFR-BR paper: there are simply more information sets which are guaranteed to have non-positive regret. We discuss the method in detail in section 4.
For our purposes, a more significant property is that there is no need to store anything about the subproblem for the best response player. All that is needed is the probabilities of reaching possible states at the root of the subproblem, which only depends on the current strategy profile in the trunk. CFR-BR only stores information about the CFR player within subproblems. By having both players use best responses, our proposed method does not need to store any information about the subproblems. Eliminating information within the subproblems reduces the memory requirement to be linear in the number of information sets in the trunk, plus whatever amount of memory is needed to solve one single subproblem. Depending on the sizes of the trunk and subproblems, and the number of subproblems, treating the subproblems independently could lead to a substantial reduction in space. For example, solving the game of two player limit Texas Hold'em poker with other CFR variants would require on the order of 100TB, even though CFR is a memory efficient algorithm and only uses memory on the same order as the size of the final strategy description. In contrast, solving the game by splitting the game at the second round would only require on the order of 1GB [5] .
The cost of discarding subproblem strategies at each iteration is that the output of the algorithm does not include a policy for acting within the subproblems. We will only have the probabilities for the strategy within the trunk. To get the strategy within a subproblem, we must recover it by solving a new problem. The second contribution of this paper is an error-bounded method of recovering subproblem strategies. While this is needed for CFR-D, this method is not strictly tied to CFR-D, and could be applied in other situations.
Unlike the subproblem solutions needed to solve the trunk, recovering an equilibrium strategy in a subproblem is not simply a matter of finding a subproblem equilibrium strategy given the current trunk policy. For example, consider the case where the p 2 strategy in the trunk dictates that p 2 never reaches the subproblem. Because all leaf values will be 0, any strategy for p 1 in the subproblem will be part of an equilibrium profile, even with an extra condition ensuring that it is a counterfactual best response. p 1 is free to choose a strategy where the counterfactual value for p 2 might be very high. If the p 1 strategy is highly exploitable, p 2 might change their trunk strategy so that it plays into the subproblem, taking advantage of the poor p 1 strategy in that subproblem.
Using the counterfactual values observed in the trunk at the root of the subproblems, we can build a modified subproblem. To find the strategy for a player (for example, p 1 ) we add a binary decision for every opponent (p 2 if we're finding a p 1 strategy) information set at the root of the subproblem. One choice immediately ends the game, with a value based on the counterfactual value observed while solving the trunk. The other choice leads to the subproblem. This arrangement ensures that p 1 finds a strategy which minimises p 2 best response values, without expending too much effort on the cases where p 2 would simply choose not to play. We discuss the process of recovering subproblem strategies in detail in section 5.
Generating the Trunk Strategy using CFR-D
CFR-D finds an approximation of a Nash equilibrium by generating a pair of lowregret strategies. To save space, the game is split up into a trunk and a number of subproblems, and the action probabilities are only saved within the trunk. All of the subproblems must be independent, so that for any state h in the subproblem, for all j ∈ I(h), j is also in the subproblem.
We also need to augment the set of information sets in the trunk, at the root of each subproblem. For all players p, we must partition the states at the root of a subproblem according to the information set I which is the last information set at which player p acted. Note that this is a slight extension of the usual definition of an information set, which is only defined for the player which is acting. These special information sets partition the states at the root of the game for both players.
As part of the solution process, we will need to be able to solve a subproblem given a trunk strategy σ. With a fixed policy σ in the trunk, solving a subproblem means finding a strategy profileσ for the subproblem such that for either player p, σ p[SG←σp] is a best response to σ −p[SG←σ−p] within the restricted space of strategies that play like σ outside of the subproblem. The solutionσ must also satisfy one additional constraint to satisfy the counterfactual nature of CFR. If the probability of a player reaching an information set I is 0, that is π σ p (I) = 0, the strategy after I must still be a best response even if the trunk strategy was changed so that π σ p (I) was not 0 (i.e., a counterfactual consideration.) Without this constraint,σ will not necessarily have non-negative counterfactual regret in the subproblem.
To see why there can be positive counterfactual regret, consider the case when π σ p (I) = 0 for some I at the root of a subproblem. For any information set J ∈ I p which is a descendant of I, u (J, a) is not multiplied by π σ p (I) and can have a non-zero value. If every possible policy under I is a part of a Nash equilibrium because the values are uniformly 0, an arbitrarily chosen Nash equilibrium is unlikely to achieve the best counterfactual value, which may be non-zero.
There are at least three possible strategies for finding an equilibrium which satisfies the counterfactual value constraint. First, we could generate an arbitrary Nash equilibrium, and then fix it with a post-processing step which computes the best response using counterfactual values whenever the reach probability is 0. Second, we could try directly adding the constraint to some other solution method, like a sequence form linear program [6] or iterated smoothing [3] . Finally, we could simply use some CFR variant to solve the subproblem, as they naturally produce strategies with the desired property. Note that because CFR-D is a solution method, we could use CFR-D itself as a solution method for the subproblems. With this recursive decomposition, and a game with sufficient structure, the memory requirements to find the top-level trunk strategy would be linear in the depth of the game.
CFR-D, our proposed method for solving the trunk of a game, is an iterative algorithm. At each step, there are three stages. First, the current trunk strategy is computed from the regrets, and the average trunk strategy is updated. Next, subproblems are examined one at a time. Each subproblem is solved, and using this solution, counterfactual values are computed and recorded for the special information sets at the root of the subproblem, for both players. The subproblem solution is then discarded. In the final stage of a CFR-D iteration, counterfactual values are propagated up the trunk from the subproblems and from any terminal states which are in the trunk, updating regrets as we go. Solving a game using CFR-D is described in Algorithm 1.
If the counterfactual regret at an information set I at the root of a subproblem is bounded by S at each time step, then at time T the accumulated full counterfactual regret R T f ull (I) ≤ T S . Following Zinkevich et al.'s argument in Appendix A.1 [10] , the average regret over the whole game will be bounded by N T R √ AT /T + N S S , where N T R is the number of information sets in the trunk, and N S is the number of information sets which are at the root of a subproblem, and A is the maximum number of available actions at an information set in the trunk.
For simplicity, CFR-D was described using the original CFR algorithm of Zinkevich et al. in the trunk. There is nothing that precludes using sampling variants like MCCFR instead. Some variants of MCCFR, like external sampling [8] , are often faster than CFR, and this may also be the case in CFR-D for some games.
Recovering a Subproblem Strategy
We now present a method of recovering a strategy in a subproblem, given some information about the root of the subproblem. Without this, CFR-D is largely useless: unless we are only interested in the game value, at some point we will presumably want to know the action probabilities at some information set in a subproblem, but they have been discarded. This problem might also arise in other situations. For example, we might wish to move a Nash equilibrium strategy from some large machine to one with very limited memory. If we can recover the strategy in a subproblem, we can throw away parts of the original strategy until the remaining portion is small enough.
Recovering a subproblem strategy requires a modified game. To see why, consider what happens if we directly use the trunk strategy probabilities to re-solve the subproblem, as done by PS-Opti [1] and GS1 [4] . A simple counterexample can be found in the case where the trunk strategy σ 1 for p 1 never reaches the subproblem, so that π (z) = 0 for any z ∈ SG and subproblem strategyσ. Any p 2 subproblem strategy is then part of a Nash equilibrium of the subproblem. For many of these strate-
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, z)up(z); cf vI S,p = cf vI S,p + vI S,p /T ; end end for information set I in the trunk, visited in post-order depth first order do childval = 0; for each action a do for each child J of I consistent with a do childvala = childvala + σ(I, a)vJ ; end end vI = childval · probsI ; for each action a do rI,a = rI,a + childvala − vI ; end end end gies, however, the counterfactual values for p 1 -the utility they would get if they had played into the subproblem -may be higher than the value p 1 gets elsewhere in the game. If the counterfactual value of the subproblem is higher than the counterfactual value elsewhere, p 1 has incentive to alter their play in the trunk. If p 1 can achieve a higher value by changing their policy, the combination of the original p 2 strategy and the new p 2 subproblem strategy can not be part of the original Nash equilibrium strategy in the full game.
For a more concrete example, consider the game in the right side of Figure 1 introduced in Section 1. Let the trunk be the player one choices of tic-tac-toe /checkers and tic-tac-toe /checkers , and the two subproblems are tic-tac-toe plus tic-tac-toe , and checkers plus checkers . Let us also assume that the subproblems are set up so that in every Nash equilibrium, player one always chooses to play checkers or checkers . If the trunk strategy is part of an equilibrium, then the probabilities of player one reaching Figure 2 : Construction of the Recovery Game from a Subproblem tic-tac-toe and tic-tac-toe are both 0. Because player one does not reach the tic-tactoe games, if we re-solve the tic-tac-toe /tic-tac-toe subproblem independently of the whole game, player two is free to pick any policyσ ttt , as the player two value (actual or counterfactual) of every subproblem policy is 0, including policies where player two would be letting player one win. That is,σ ttt is part of a best response to the original player one equilibrium strategy. The player one equilibrium strategy, however, may no longer be a best response: playing tic-tac-toe might now be a better choice if player two lets player one win.
Note that these previous examples are slightly different than the example used to show that the counterfactual value constraint is needed when solving a subproblem within an iteration of CFR-D. It is also insufficient to simply handle the special case where a player never reaches a subproblem: there are more complicated counterexamples for other cases if we solve the unmodified subproblem using the trunk policy.
The problems that arise with using the subproblem directly suggest that in addition to solving the subproblem, we wish to minimise the difference between the opponent's counterfactual value for the recovery subproblem strategy, and the counterfactual value of the subproblem that is achieved by the equilibrium strategy in the whole game. We propose using the game shown in Figure 2 . From here on, we will assume, without loss of generality, that we are recovering a strategy for p 1 . We will distinguish the recovery game from the original game by using˜to distinguish states, utilities, or strategies for the recovery game.
There is an initial chance node which leads to statesr ∈R, corresponding to all states r ∈ R at the root of the subproblem in the original game. Each stater ∈R occurs with probability π σ −2 (h)/k, where the constant k = r∈R π σ −2 (r) is used to ensure that the probabilities sum to 1.R is partitioned into information sets IR 2 that align with the last choice p 2 made, corresponding to the set of states which can be assigned different p 2 reach probabilities given different trunk strategies. For anyr,r ∈ R, I(r) = I(r ) ⇐⇒ π ρ 2 (r) = π ρ 2 (r ) for all ρ. These are the same special information sets used in the CFR-D trunk solution algorithm.
At eachr ∈R, p 2 has a binary choice of F or T . After T , the game ends. After F , the game is the same as the original subproblem. All leaf utilities are multiplied by k to undo the effects of normalising the initial chance event. So, ifz corresponds to a leaf z in the original subproblem,ũ 2 (z) = ku 2 (z). Ifz is a terminal state after a T action,
No further complications are needed, so that if we solve the proposed game, we can directly use the recovered p 1 strategy in the original subproblem. In Section 8, we give a proof that the exploitability increases by no more than the regret bound on the original subproblem, plus the regret of the recovery strategy. Theorem 1 implies that if we recover the strategy for both players at all subproblems, the regret of the complete recovered strategy is bounded from above by
R is the regret bound in a recovery subproblem.
Experimental Results
We demonstrate CFR-D using Leduc Hold'em poker. This is a small poker variant which has become a testbed for research on imperfect information games [9, 2] . The game involves a deck of 6 cards (2 suits and 3 ranks) and two rounds of betting, with at most 1 bet and 1 raise per round. Each player starts by paying one chip, with bets and raises costing 2 chips in the first round and 4 chips in the second round. The game is complicated enough to show many interesting behaviours, but with only 936 information sets it is small enough that a wide range of experiments can easily be run and evaluated. While it would definitely be interesting to test CFR-D performance in a much larger game like limit Texas Hold'em, there is a serious issue with evaluation. Current solution techniques can already solve very large games, and evaluating the resulting solutions to find the approximation error can be a computation that requires on the order of CPU-months, even though the strategy probabilities are simple table lookups. Adding in the cost for recovering subproblem strategies for a CFR-D solution would make this evaluation a significant computational undertaking. Moving to an even larger game which current techniques could not handle, like limit Texas Hold'em, the evaluation is completely beyond current computational resources.
The trunk used was the first round of betting, with five subproblems corresponding to the five different betting sequences in the first round which continue to the second round. Our implementation of CFR-D also uses CFR for solving subproblems and strategy recovery games. All the reported results use 200,000 iterations for each of the recovery subproblems. The exploitability numbers reported are the average of the expected utilities of the best response strategies for both players. Each line of Figure 3 plots the exploitability for different numbers of subproblem iterations, ranging from 100 to 12,800 iterations. There are results for 500, 2,000, 8,000, and 32,000 trunk iterations.
Looking from left to right shows the improvement in solution quality as the quality of subproblem solutions improves. The four separate lines show the improvement in solution quality for an increasing number of CFR-D iterations. Using 32,000 trunk iterations, 12,800 subproblem iterations, and 200,000 recovery game iterations, we can drive the exploitability to 7.5 chips per 1,000 hands. Given that the error bounds for CFR variants is O( √ T ), one might expect exploitability results to be a straight line on a log-log plot. In these experiments, however, CFR is being run on the trunk, subproblems, and the recovery games. From Section 5, the error is a sum of three terms: N T R / (AT ), 3N S S , and 2N S R . For each of the lines on the graph, N T R / (AT ) and 2N S R are constant non-zero values. Only S decreases as the number of subproblem iteration increases, so each line is approaching N T R / (AT ) + 2N S R > 0, which shows up as a plateau on a log-log plot.
The method of PS-Opti [1] and GS1 [4] has no theoretical guarantee, but there remains a question of how well it does in practice. To address that, we use the GS1 method in Leduc Hold'em. The initial step, as in CFR-D, is to generate a strategy for the trunk. PS-Opti and GS1 both use a static estimate of the value of a subproblem. To provide a best case evaluation of the method, we actually solve the entire game with a sequence form linear program [6] , resulting in a trunk strategy which is guaranteed to be part of a Nash equilibrium. Using the action probabilities of the trunk strategy to come up with probabilities of reaching a subproblem, we then solved each subproblem using additional linear programs. Finally, the subproblem strategies were combined with the trunk strategy to get a strategy for the whole game.
The strategy generated by the unsafe method was exploitable for 0.0561 chips/hand. At each step, there was approximately 0 error (on the order of 10 − 11) so the exploitability all lies in the unsafe method of decomposition. Without a modification of the method, there is no way to drive the exploitability any lower. In contrast, the least exploitable CFR-D data point was already about 7.4 times less exploitable, and could be made arbitrarily close to 0 using additional iterations.
As a final step to check that we implemented the unsafe method correctly, we verified that the strategy generated using the unsafe method achieved an average value of 0 against a Nash equilibrium. By construction, the unsafe method is trying to generate a strategy profile which is a best response to a Nash equilibrium. The error arises from the fact that the unsafe method has no constraints to guarantee that a Nash equilibrium is still a best response to the new strategy profile.
Conclusions
In perfect information games, decomposing the problem into independently handled subproblems is a simple and effective method which is used to greatly reduce the space and time requirements of algorithms. The incomplete knowledge in imperfect information games has previously meant that decomposition into parts leads to the loss of any theoretical guarantees on solution quality. Despite the lack of a bound on exploitability, decomposition has occasionally been used in an attempt to solve imperfect information games, due to the reduction in space requirements. We present a novel method of handling subproblems which retains theoretical bounds on overall solution quality. In contrast, we demonstrate that even in a best case scenario, there can be significant error in using the existing unsafe method of decomposition.
Proofs
Theorem 1 gives a proof of the upper bound on exploitability of the recovered strategy. The context for this section is as follows. Strategy profile σ is an approximation of a Nash equilibrium for the whole game. The induced recovery game strategy profile σF is the strategy where for all information sets in the subtrees under the F action, σF takes the same action as σ, and at the p 2 information sets where F or T is chosen, p 2 always picks F . As in Section 5, we will be considering the process from the point of view of recovering a strategy for p 1 . 
